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There is a growing amount of literature suggesting people tend to behave inconsistently
over time, which is driven by decreasing impatience. In addition, many studies have
found relations between discounting estimates from experiments and field behavior, such
as smoking cessation and dieting. However, these studies often did not separate time
inconsistency from other factors such as utility curvature or the level of discounting.
In order to establish the relation between field behavior and the degree of time
inconsistency, it is therefore necessary to obtain a pure measure of the latter that
is not distorted by these other factors. The present study implements a recently
introduced measure of deviations from constant impatience, called the “Decreasing
Impatience (DI)-index,” to estimate the degree to which people deviate from constant
impatience. We provide the first extension of DI to health outcomes, both for individual
and societal discounting using three different starting points. Moreover, we include a
survey gathering information about several health-related behaviors, in order to test for
the relationship between the amount of decreasing impatience and healthy behavior.
We observe that decreasing impatience is the modal preference, although constant and
increasing impatience are no exceptions, and, hence, these types of discounters should
not be neglected. Furthermore, the DI-index is higher for individual health outcomes
than for societal health outcomes, but is not distributed differently among the three
classes of discounters. The DI-index decreases with starting period for individual health
outcomes, but not for societal health outcomes. Very few significant relations between
time inconsistency and self-reported health-related behavior were found.
Keywords: decreasing impatience, health, increasing impatience, time inconsistency, time preference
INTRODUCTION
Many daily decisions require an intertemporal trade-off between earlier and later consequences.
These vary from savings for pensions, to learning for exams, to more exercise now to reduce the
chance of becoming obese later. In these decisions, agents’ discount rates play an important role.
Economic theory predicts that the more agents discount the future, the less they will engage in
future-oriented behavior, such as saving. During the last few decades it has become clear that
besides the discount rate, the amount of time inconsistency is also highly relevant for many
decisions. For example, heterogeneity in time inconsistency may explain why agents with the same
absolute discount rate differ in their tendency to postpone an annoying task [1].
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Because of their differential impact on intertemporal choices,
it is crucial to disentangle time inconsistency and discount
rates in empirical studies. Furthermore, these two factors
may both be confused with utility curvature, which also
affects most elicitations of discounting parameters [2, 3].
A recent study proposed a way to disentangle these three
fundamentally different concepts, including a first empirical
test demonstrating its feasibility [1]. In particular, Rohde [1]
introduced the Decreasing Impatience (DI)-Index, which is a
summary measure of the degree to which an agent deviates
from constant discounting; i.e., the degree to which the agent
is time inconsistent. She showed that this measure is neither
affected by the level of impatience, nor by the shape of the
agent’s utility function. The experimental results reported in
her paper indicated that, for monetary outcomes, decreasing
impatience was the modal type of discounting, confirming
most of the previous literature. However, it also became clear
that a sizable minority of subjects was increasingly impatient,
highlighting the need to account for this type of preferences
as well. Finally, Rohde’s [1] experiment was complemented by
a survey asking several questions about health-related behavior
and found no significant associations between those and the
DI-index.
This lack of association is surprising, given the perceived
importance of decreasing impatience, and may have several
explanations. One of them is simply a lack of power, but another
one may be the use of money as a stimulus used in the elicitation
of the DI-index, to predict health-related behavior. Earlier
work, however, has demonstrated that deviations from constant
discounting aremore pronounced for health outcomes compared
to monetary outcomes [4]. As such, the lack of association
reported in Rohde [1] may be explained by the disparity between
elicitation and outcome. To test this hypothesis, we elicit four DI-
indices using health outcomes in this study: two in an individual
context and two in a societal context. In addition, we implement
the same survey as Rohde to see if the use of health outcomes
allows us to observe a significant association between time
consistency and health behaviors, such as smoking and alcohol
consumption.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the
theoretical background in section Theoretical background. After
that, we describe the experimental design in section Experiment,
followed by the results in section Results. Finally, in section
Discussion, we discuss the results, and conclude.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Notation
In our experiment, we will consider indifferences between timed
outcomes (t:x), where x denotes a health improvement and t
denotes its time of onset. We consider the usual preference
relation < over these outcomes. A weak [strict] preference is
denoted by < [≻] and indifference by ∼. Throughout the paper
Abbreviations:DBI, Duration before implementation; DI, Decreasing impatience;
DU, Discounted utility; EQ-5D, EuroQol Five-Dimension; ERIM, Erasmus
Research Institute of Management.
we assume the discounted utility (DU) model to hold:
DU (x, t) = δ (t)U(x). (1)
Here, DU denotes discounted utility, δ(t) is the discount function,
and U(x) is the instantaneous utility of outcome x. The standard
DU model is the constant discounting model [5], which models
intertemporal outcome profiles by the following formula:
DU (xt , xt+1, . . . , xT) =
∑T
t=0
γ tU(xt), (2)
where γ represents the discount factor. One of the axioms of
this model is stationarity, which causes agents to always act time
consistently; i.e., they stick to their plans [6]. However, many
empirical studies have demonstrated that agents often will not
behave this way, with a tendency to postpone annoying tasks
(e.g., doing homework, stopping smoking) and to indulge in
activities giving immediate benefits (e.g., purchasing a car, eating
candy) [7, 8]. This kind of behavior can often be explained
by hyperbolic discounting models that incorporate decreasing
impatience. The most popular hyperbolic discounting function
is quasi-hyperbolic discounting [9, 10]:
DU (xt , xt+1, . . . , xT) = U (x0)+
∑T
t=1
ßδtU(xt). (3)
Here, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 represents a measure of the “immediacy
effect” or “present bias,” giving a penalty to all outcomes
occurring in the future, but not discriminating between the
amounts of the delay for t > 0. This model reduces to
constant discounting for the special case where β = 1. In
other words, the quasi-hyperbolic model assumes that agents
are decreasingly impatient only when the present is involved,
and constantly impatient when only comparing future outcomes.
By contrast, alternative models allow for universally decreasing
impatience, i.e., even if the present is not involved (e.g., power
discounting [11], proportional discounting [12], generalized
hyperbolic discounting [13], and nonlinear time perception
[14]).
Related Literature
Some previous studies have investigated the measurement of
decreasing impatience. First, Prelec [15] proposed to assess the
degree of Pratt-Arrow convexity of the logarithm of the discount
function. However, this method is hard to implement in practice
because it requires assumptions about or measurement of the
utility function, and also specifying a parametric form of the
discount function, for example assuming constant discounting.
There is overwhelming empirical evidence of violations of
constant discounting in the monetary domain [16], but more
recently such violations have also been widely documented
for health outcomes [17, 18]. In both domains, there is
increasing evidence that a substantial minority of subjects is
increasingly impatient, both for money [19] and for health
[4], highlighting the need to accommodate this behavior as
well [20]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies
have been performed yet that measure the degree of time
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inconsistency for health outcomes, be it decreasing or increasing
impatience.
As can be seen from Equation 1, intertemporal choices
are not only affected by time preferences, but also by utility
curvature. Therefore, when attempting to measure discount
functions, it is important to assure they are separated from any
effects of utility on intertemporal choices. Rohde [21] developed
the hyperbolic factor to simplify this practical implementation,
which was measured by Attema et al. [19], who found that
a majority of choices satisfied increasing impatience. A few
years later, Bleichrodt et al. [4] used the method of Attema
et al. in the health domain, where they observed decreasing
impatience to be the dominant pattern, but also a substantial
minority who were increasingly impatient. However, as explained
by Rohde [1], the hyperbolic factor can only be computed for
modest amounts of decreasing and increasing impatience. This
led her to propose the DI-index, which does not suffer from
this drawback, and she measured it for monetary outcomes.
Our study is the first to measure the DI-indices for health
outcomes. As such, in this study we are able tomeasure the degree
of time inconsistency without any distortion caused by utility
curvature.
EXPERIMENT
Subjects and Design
Our subject pool consisted of a sample of 99 university students
(47 female, 50 male, 2 unknown), with a mean age of 19.3
(SD = 1.6). Subjects were recruited by the Erasmus Research
Participation System and the experiment was administered in
the Erasmus Behavioral Lab. The subjects received course credits
for their participation. This study was carried out in accordance
with the recommendations of the Erasmus Research Institute
of Management (ERIM) Internal Review Board. The protocol
was approved by the ERIM Internal Review Board, Section
Experiments. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. This study used
a within-subjects design, to determine DI-indices for both
individual and societal decision-making for health outcomes.
All subjects completed the individual task first, after which they
completed the societal task. Our stimuli-durations for the both
tasks were chosen to maximize comparability to Rohde’s [1]
study. Hence, we set these durations to 0, 2, and 4 months, with
these stimuli-durations being presented in increasing order in the
survey.
Procedure
Subjects received paper-and-pencil instructions (see Appendix
A) for this study as part of a larger survey on health-related
decision-making, which is not discussed in this paper. For the
individual task, subjects had to assume they were experiencing
chronic back pain, as described by the following problems:
• You have moderate problems in walking about.
• You have moderate problems performing your usual activities
(e.g., work, study, housework, family or leisure activities).
• You have moderate pain or discomfort.
Subjects were instructed that two treatments (A and B)
were available to relieve this chronic back pain. The health
improvements of treatment A and B were based on the
description suggested by Bleichrodt et al. [4], and consisted
of an improvement in some dimensions of the EuroQol Five-
Dimension (EQ-5D) classification system. The descriptions of
these two treatments were presented to subjects on a separate
paper, which was put on subjects’ desks. In all cases, Treatment B
was more effective than Treatment A. Both treatments removed
the pain, but B also improved the problems with walking and
usual activities. The effects of the treatments started immediately
at its onset and lasted for exactly one week. The amount of
time before the treatments occur will be referred to as “duration
before implementation” (DBI). In all cases, chronic back pain
would return after 1 week. Such questions are common in
elicitations of time preferences for health outcomes, except that
usually only one change in health is studied (e.g., Treatment
A), with its duration being varied [22, 23]. As explained by
Bleichrodt et al. [4], the advantages of keeping the duration of
change fixed are that the utility for time duration can be entirely
general, without having to impose simplifying assumptions to
enable the analysis of responses, and that subjects will more
likely concentrate on the time point at which the change occurs
(i.e., the DBI). The latter is desirable if one is interested in the
properties of the discount function and not in those of the utility
function.
The societal task used a similar set-up, except that in this
task the health improvements did not accrue to the subjects
personally but to a group of students (similar to them), who were
suffering from chronic back pain. The description of this chronic
health state was identical to the description in the individual task.
Subjects had to trade off a higher amount of people receiving
the same health improvement to a delay of the realization of
this health improvement. More specifically, they faced a trade-
off between treating 40 students (Option A) or incurring a delay
to treat 50 students (Option B). These numbers were also used
by Rohde [1], in terms of monetary outcomes (i.e., e40 and
e50). By using these numbers, our ratio of the earlier to the
later outcomes was the same, facilitating comparison of the
discount rates. The treatment was the same in both conditions
(individual vs. societal), being Treatment B of the individual task,
i.e., alleviating the pain and problems on other dimensions for
1 week.
In both the societal and individual task, subjects faced a choice
list (see Appendix A for an example), with Treatment A on the
left hand side, given a fixed DBI (t0−2), and Treatment B on the
right hand side with a monotonically increasing DBI. We elicit
indifferences at s0 = 0, s1 = 2 months, and s2 = 4 months. These
numbers were also used by Rohde [1], except that she used weeks
instead of months. We did so because our health improvement
lasted 1 week and it might have caused confusion if both this
duration and the delay were expressed in months. Before subjects
started working on these choice lists, they faced several questions
aimed at determining comprehension. We infer indifference at
the DBI where subjects switch from B to A, in agreement with
the conventional use of choice lists in experimental economics
[24].
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Calculation of DI-Indices
Summarizing, we obtain three indifferences for both individual
and societal health outcomes. Indifferences of the form (si : x) ∼
(ti : y) can be evaluated by the following equation under DU
(Equation 1):
D(si)U(x) = D(ti)U(y) with i = 0, 1 or 2. (4)
As is described by Rohde [1], the DI-index can be computed
from every two indifferences of the form (s:x)∼(t:y) and
(s+σ :x)∼(t+τ :y) [1]. In our experiment we obtain s, t, τ and σ
as follows: for any si, with i = 0, 1 or 2, we set si = s. We then
obtain t by the elicited indifference (si : x) ∼
(
ti : y
)
, with t = ti.
Next, we set σ , which corresponds here to setting σ = si+1 − si,
and elicit the indifference (si+1 : x) ∼
(
ti+1 : y
)
. We proceed by
finding τ by determining ti+1− ti. The DI-index is then given by:
DI =
τ − σ
σ (t − s)
, (5)
where (as shown by Rohde [1]) constant [decreasing, increasing]
impatience corresponds to a DI-index of 0 [>0,<0].
In the case of societal discounting, we elicit similar
indifferences to (si : x) ∼ (ti : y) where x and y are replaced by
m and n, where m and n are the number of patients treated at
time period, e.g., (si : 40) ∼ (ti : 50). The derivation of DI-indices
does not change.
Because two questions are needed to elicit one DI-index, our
design enabled us to elicit two DI-indices for both the individual
and the societal task, where we will indicate individual DI-indices
by DI-I and societal DI-indices by DI-S. We furthermore add to
these the pre-set durations used to derive them, yielding DI-I-02
and DI-I-24 (and DI-S-02 and DI-S-24 for societal).
To give an example, imagine that for the individual task a
subject in our study has the following indifferences:
(0 : x) ∼
(
5 : y
)
;
(2 : x) ∼
(
8 : y
)
;
(4 : x) ∼ (13 : y).
This means that we have s = 0 and σ = 2 for the first
two indifferences, and s = 2 and σ = 2 for the last two
indifferences. We elicited indifferences at t’s= 5, 8, 13. This gives
t = 5 and τ = 3 when the DI-index is calculated based on the
first two indifferences, yielding DI-I-02 = 0.1. Similarly, when
constructing the DI-index of the second and third indifferences,
this yields DI-I-24= 0.25. Hence, this subject would be classified
as decreasingly impatient.
Survey Questions
In order to maximize comparability with the study of Rohde
[1], we implemented the same questions in an accompanying
survey. This consisted of a number of demographic and
behavioral characteristics and the self-control questions of
Ameriks et al. [25]. The survey developed by Ameriks et al.
[25] aims to measure self-control problems with a self-reported
questionnaire. Additional self-awareness questions concerning
sports, study, and class preparation were asked [1, 26], which
were administered on an 8-point Likert scale. In this paper we
focus on the role of DI-indices in health behavior. As such,
our results for self-control problems and self-awareness can be
found in Appendix B. The health behavior variables measured
[using identical questions as in Rohde [1]] include the number of
hours of sports per week, smoking behavior, amount of alcohol
consumption per week, and length and weight (out of which the
body mass index was computed). The following demographics
were obtained: age, gender, whether or not respondents live with
their parents, nationality (Dutch or non-Dutch), and whether
and how much money they saved. In addition, we measured
subjects’ health status on a 10-point scale and their subjective life
expectancy.
RESULTS
Five subjects did not complete the societal task, while one did
not complete the individual task. As in Rohde [1], the number
of subjects who always chose the patient option was quite high,
especially for the societal task (12 never switched in both tasks,
and 26 subjects did not switch in the societal task). These subjects
had to be excluded from the analysis of decreasing impatience,
since it was not possible to compute a DI-index for them (14
subjects who did not switch in the societal task, did switch in the
individual task and could, thus, be included in the analysis of the
DI-I. All analyses were also performed excluding the respondents
who did not switch in the societal task, which did not yield
different results. The results are available from the authors upon
request). Another 9 subjects indirectly violated impatience by
having si > ti for at least one indifference in DI-I, and 9 subjects
(not necessarily the same) had si > ti in DI-S. These subjects were
also dropped from the sample, although we could analyze the
subparts including the subjects who did not violate impatience
for one of the two tasks. Finally, two subjects had multiple
switching points and were also removed from our sample. This
resulted in 99-1-12-9-2 = 75 included subjects for the individual
task, and 99-5-26-9-2= 57 included subjects for the societal task.
Figure 1 plots the distributions of the DI-indices for both tasks.
Table 1 classifies the subjects into increasing, decreasing,
and constant impatience for each of the four choices (i.e.,
two for the individual task and two for the societal task). A
comparison of DI-I-02 and DI-I-24 reveals evidence of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting: DI-I-02 is significantly higher than DI-
I-24 according to a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (p < 0.01).
However, we did not find such a difference for the societal
task (p = 0.81). Spearman rank correlation analyses showed a
significant correlation between the two indices for both tasks
(p< 0.01).
Table 2 shows summary measures of the DI-indices. These
indicate a difference between the two tasks, with those of the
individual task being higher than those of the societal task.
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests confirm the significance of these
differences at the 10% level (p < 0.09 for DI-02 and p < 0.02 for
DI-24). However, comparing the percentages of DI, CI, and II (as
derived from Table 1), it turns out that such differences are not
present for the discounting classifications (χ2-tests, p> 0.44).
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FIGURE 1 | Distributions individual DI indices (left) and societal DI-indices (right).
TABLE 1 | Classification of degree of impatience.
DI-I-02 DI-I-24 Total DI-S-02 DI-S-24 Total
Constant impatience 21 (28%) 19 (25.3%) 40 (26.7%) 13 (22.8%) 13 (22.8%) 26 (22.8%)
Decreasing impatience 42 (56%) 42 (56%) 84 (56%) 30 (52.6%) 34 (59.6%) 64 (56.1%)
Increasing impatience 12 (16%) 14 (18.7%) 26 (17.3%) 14 (24.6%) 10 (17.5%) 24 (21.1%)
Total 75 75 150 57 57 114
Discount Factors
Because we used a qualitative health state improvement in the
individual task, it was not possible to estimate discount factors
for this task. For the societal task, on the other hand, this was
possible, when assuming a linear societal utility function over
number of patients. In the first choice list, the indifference under
constant discounting is evaluated as in Equation (2), by:
40 = 50∗γ t↔ γ = 0.81/t , (6)
with t inmonths and γ themonthly discount factor. This resulted
in average annual discount rates close to 30%. However, it should
be kept in mind that this is an overestimate of the true discount
rate since the non-switchers are excluded. If we include themwith
the conservative assumption that these subjects have a discount
rate of 0%, the average discount rates reduce to rates around 10%.
We also performed the analysis assuming all these subjects would
have switched at the next possible switching point, not included
in the choice list. This gives theirmaximumpossible discount rate
(i.e., 5.68%). The average discount rates are around 20% in that
case. All these analyses did not show any differences between the
three choice lists.
The social discount rates were not correlated with age or
gender (Spearman test), but one of the behavioral variables
was correlated with the discount rates. We found a negative
correlation between living at home and the discount rate
(p < 0.02 for all three discount factors). All other correlations
were not significant.
Relationship DI-Index With Demographics
and Health Behavior
Ninety-one subjects completed the survey. Table 3 provides
summary statistics of the survey responses. None of the DI-
indices were correlated with age and gender, except for DI-S-
12, which was correlated with gender (p < 0.05). In particular,
women were found to have a lower DI-index than men. The
regressions of each variable on the DI-indices also did not yield
any significant coefficients, except for hours of sports, where the
coefficient of DI-I-23 was positive and significant (p= 0.05). The
direction of the latter correlation is counterintuitive.
DISCUSSION
This study has been the first to quantify the amount of time
consistency for health outcomes, without distortions caused
by utility curvature or the level of discounting. We find that
the majority of subjects are decreasingly impatient for both
individual and societal choices, but still there is a sizable minority
with either constant or increasing impatience. Furthermore, the
amount of decreasing impatience is higher for individual choices
than for societal choices, although there is no such difference
for the degree of decreasingly impatient choices. Hence, it seems
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TABLE 2 | Summary statistics DI-indices.
DI-I-02 DI-I-24 DI-S-02 DI-S-24
Mean (s.d.) 0.24 (0.57) 0.08 (0.19) 0.08 (0.24) 0.07 (0.13)
Median 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05
Interquartile range 0–0.35 0–0.14 0–0.08 0–0.11
that those subjects who are decreasingly impatient, are so more
strongly for individual choices than for societal choices, but the
qualitative distribution of discount types does not differ between
tasks. We also observe evidence in favor of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, with more decreasing impatience when the present
is involved than when both outcomes occur in the future. Finally,
we do not find many significant associations between the DI-
indices and the demographic and health-related data obtained
from the survey.
Our results are largely similar to those of Rohde [1], indicating
that both the frequency and the amount of decreasing impatience
are similar for health and money. In particular, the data for
both domains clearly reveal decreasing impatience, but at the
same time highlight the necessity to also allow for agents with
increasing impatience, which constitute a non-negligible part of
the population. The results presented in this study also confirm
the conclusion drawn by Bleichrodt et al. [4] with regard to the
amount of decreasing and increasing impatience.
The reported study has a number of drawbacks. First, the
experiment always started with the individual task. Future work
could randomize these to control for order effects. A second
drawback is the high amount of subjects for whom the DI-index
could not be calculated, because they did not switch between
the smaller-sooner outcome and the larger-later outcome. This
problem may be addressed by extending the choice list, so that
the DI-index can also be calculated for subjects with a low, but
positive, time preference. Another possibility is to use a larger
time unit, such as years instead of months. However, this will
come at the expense of the precision of time preference estimates
for early switchers. A third limitation is that, as in most time
preference measurements, our design did not allow for negative
discounting. Future work could therefore extend this study to
allow for the assessment of negative discount rates, since there
is some evidence for this, especially for outcomes framed as
losses [27, 28], also in the health domain [29–31]. However, it is
important to be aware that a violation of constant discounting
then has a different interpretation, since time inconsistency
for patient subjects means that they are either decreasingly
or increasingly patient, instead of impatient. Moreover, the
theoretical derivation of the DI-index [1] was only performed for
the case of impatience, and, hence, it is not yet clear if the same
results also apply to the case of patience. Fourth, our instructions
told subjects to adopt chronic back pain as their neutral level of
health. Because most subjects were healthy, chronic back pain
could have been perceived as a loss and not as neutral. However,
empirical evidence suggests that the reference point or neutral
level of health can be manipulated and even healthy subjects
usually adopt a health state which is worse than their current
health if instructed to do so [32–35].
TABLE 3 | Summary statistics of demographic and behavioral variables.
Variable Description Mean (SD)
Gender Male/female 51.5% male
Age Age in years 19.3 (1.6)
Health Health on a 10-point Likert scale 8.4 (1.1)
SLE Subjective life expectancy 84.1 (9.9)
Sports Number of hours of sports per
week
4.5 (2.9)
Smoke Daily smoker/Smokes every now
and then/No-smoker
27.5% smokes every
day or every now and
then
Alcoholdays Average number of days drinking
alcohol per week
1.6 (1.1)
Alcoholglasses Average number of glasses of
alcohol on drinking days
4.5 (3.9)
Alcoholweek Average number of glasses of
alcohol per week
(Alcoholdays*Alcoholglasses)
9.2 (11.8)
BMI Body Mass Index (Weight in kg
divided by length in meters
squared)
21.6 (2.2)
Parents Dummy for subjects living with
their parents
38%
Nationality Dummy for Dutch subjects 62.6% Dutch
Saving Dummy for saving money (1) or
not (0)
76%
Monthly savings Average monthly savings in euros e390.80 (e2262.55)
Another future research avenue would be to extend the
measurement of the DI-index to a more representative sample
of the general public. This may also shed more light on the
relationship between the amount of time inconsistency and
health-related behaviors such as exercising, smoking, alcohol
consumption, and body-mass index. That is, it may unravel if
the lack of association in our study is the result of the low
sample size or an inherent result, indicating that previously
observed relations between time preference and healthy behavior
are fully attributable to the level of impatience and risk
aversion, instead of time inconsistency. Another explanation
could be that this lack of association is related to our
measurements, as we obtained estimates for health behavior
through self-report, while DI-indices are obtained through
revealed preference. Future work could attempt to test the
association between DI and observed behaviors such as real-
life exercise. Finally, future research can measure the DI-index
for others’ monetary outcomes (i.e., at the societal level for
money).
Several implications arise from our study. First, health
outcomes have similar characteristics as money with respect to
degrees of time inconsistency. This holds both for the amounts
of decreasing and increasing impatience, and for the amount
of very patient choices. Second, the significant amount of
increasing impatience implies that several common hyperbolic
discount functions are not suitable to capture everyone’s
time preferences; hence, attention should be directed toward
more general models such as the constant sensitivity model
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to accommodate increasing impatience for health outcomes
[20, 36]. Third, there is a difference between individual and
societal time inconsistency in that the DI-index is higher
for individual choices than for societal choices. However,
the distribution of decreasingly, constantly, and increasingly
impatient subjects does not differ between individual and societal
health choices.
It can be concluded from our results that health and money
show similar amounts of decreasing and increasing impatience.
This highlights the need to look more deeply into discounting
models that accommodate increasing impatience, instead of
only focusing on the modeling of decreasing impatience. In
addition, we have shown both similarities and discrepancies
in time consistency between individual and societal tasks in
the health domain. Finally, we did not find robust evidence
of relations between the amount of time inconsistency and
demographic characteristics or health-related behavior, although
more research is needed to explore this relationship in more
detail.
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